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Market Liquidity and Corporate Control: 
A Comment on Maug (1998)*
1Cheol Park**
This note points out a small mistake made in Maug’s 1998 paper in the Journal of Finance. It is shown that 
a correct analysis of the problem yields results different from Maug’s. In short, even when the market is very 
liquid, a large block holder with sufficient incentives to monitor the management does not emerge.  
I. Introduction
When shareholders think that their company is badly managed, they have two options. 
They can either sell their shares, or voice their discontent, for example, trying to persuade the 
management to initiate some changes or trying to change the management. Hirschman (1970) 
called the first the exit option and the second, the voice option. The exit option can be costly if 
the stock market is not so liquid that shareholders can sell their shares only at a very depressed 
price. The voice option is also costly because simply talking to the management is not without 
personal cost (time and energy), and a proxy fight, which is the main instrument for the voice 
option, is very costly. Shareholders will optimally choose their option only after an elaborate 
cost-benefit analysis.  
Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993) argue that when the stock market is very liquid, the cost 
* Financial support from the Institute of Management Research and Institute of Finance and Banking of the 
Seoul National University is gratefully acknowledged.
**Professor, College of Business Administration, Seoul National University
經營論集, 第50卷 統合號 (2016年 12月)
146  經營論集, 第50卷 統合號
of the exit option is smaller, so that most shareholders will choose the exit option. Consider 
especially the case where some shareholders get some bad information about the company 
before others. By selling their shares early before others find out, these shareholders can benefit 
from their information. If they choose the voice option, they had better have a remedy, and 
they also have to convince other shareholders that their information is indeed accurate, they do 
have a remedy. So, with a very liquid stock market, they argue, shareholders tend to choose the 
exit option, and corrective measures will not be taken. In other words, market liquidity worsens 
the quality of corporate governance. 
In a thought-provoking paper (Maug (1998)), Maug provides a counter-argument. He notes 
that not all shareholders have incentives to monitor the management, and only shareholders 
large enough will have such incentives. A liquid stock market makes it easier for someone to 
emerge as a large shareholder who has strong incentive to monitor. When the market is liquid, 
an investor can accumulate large shareholdings without affecting the share price much and 
before he makes the mandatory disclosure of his large shareholding. To show this analytically, 
Maug builds a simple model of corporate restructuring that incorporates the Kyle model of 
informed trading. 
We believe that the basic idea of Maug is sound. Moreover, his model is one of few examples 
where a corporate finance issue is embedded in a model of stock trading. However, the 
execution of the model has one problem. In his analysis, Maug makes a simplifying assumption 
to make computations easy and clean. The assumption looks innocuous, but we will show that 
it is not innocuous, and, once we get rid of the assumption, his conclusion does not follow.
This paper is structured as follows. We will first explain the model, and then we will get 
the equilibrium of the model without the Maug’s assumption. At the end, we will show how 
different the results will be without Maug’s simplifying assumption.
II. The Model
Everyone in the model is risk-neutral, and the risk-free rate is zero. This is a one company 
economy. The future value of the company, denoted by , depends on whether the company 
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will be restructured or not: 
if no restructuring
if restructuring
In this model, monitoring is identified with restructuring. If a shareholder implements 
restructuring of the company, it will cost him personally cM < ∆≡(H-L). Maug assumes 
2cM < ∆.
There are two types of shareholders. There is one large shareholder F who owns α∈(0,1) 
fraction of the firm. The large shareholder is not subject to any liquidity shock. There are 
many small shareholders, called households and denoted HH. Small shareholders are subject 
to liquidity shock. Thus with probability 0.5, a  fraction of HH sells their shares, and 
with probability 0.5, no HH sell their shares. 
As in the Kyle model, there is a market maker, who observes the total order and sets the 
price at the expected value of the company value:
P = E[ |total order]
The following figure gives us the exact time line of the model:
III. Market Equilibrium
We will consider the second round of trading. The first round of trading will be discussed 
1 2 3 4 5
Shares trade at 
initial price P0;  
F  buys α, HHs 
buy (1-α) shares








and sets the price 
at P1
Profits of the firm 
realized;  
all parties paid
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later. In the second round of trading, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. To see this, note 
that small shareholders will sell (1-α) or sells nothing with equal probability of 0.5. Without 
F ’s trade, the total order will be either - (1-α), or 0. If F always buys xB > 0 and monitors, the 
market maker can infer that F is buying and will price the order at H. In this case, F will lose 
because of the monitoring cost. Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium. If F always sells and 
does not monitor, he will not get any profit, either. So, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Now, consider a mixed strategy equilibrium where with probability q∈[0,1], F buys and 
monitors, and with probability (1-q), F sells and does not monitor. Let xB and xS be the 
amount F is buying and selling, respectively, with the convention xB≥0 and xS≤0. The 
observable total order will be: xB, xS, xB- (1-α), or xS- (1-α). If all these four numbers are 
different, then the market maker can tell whether F is buying or selling. Thus, to garble the 
information, F will set his orders so that 
The following table summarizes what happens in the market.
Order flow Transactions Probability Value Price
xB F buys; HH sell 0 q/2 H H
xB- (1-α) F buys; HH sell q/2 H qH+(1-q)L
xS F sells; HH sell 0 (1-q)/2 L qH+(1-q)L
xS- (1-α) F sells; HH sell (1-q)/2 L L
Given this pricing strategy of the market maker, buying and monitoring gives F:
Selling and not monitoring gives F:
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Since F has to be indifferent between the two options, we should get
Maug deals only with the case where  and , but 
we are going to see that this is problematic.
VI. Determination of Optimal (xB, xS)
We are now trying to determine the optimal choice of (xB, xS) subject to the constraints 
specified above. First, note that to have q∈[0,1], the following inequality must hold. 
 (✽)
If xB≤2(cM /∆-α) , then q≤0 and it is better not to restructure. If xB≥ (1-α)+2(cM /∆-α), 
then q≥1 and it is better to restructure.  
The large shareholder F will choose xB to maximize the expected profit
subject to the constraint (*). The equation f (x)=x[ (1-α)+2(cM /∆-α)-x]=0 has two roots, 
0 and , and the unconstrained maximum occurs at . 
Note that  if and only if 
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For the constraint set not to be empty, we should have . If , then no non-negative 
xB can make q a probability because q>1, and the large shareholder will simply restructure the 
firm with probability 1 and get αH-cM.  
Now, the question is whether  belongs to the constraint set when  . This is 
determined by whether or not . The inequality will hold if and only if
Note . If , this condition is automatically satisfied.  
We first discuss the case where  holds 
(a)  If , the constraint set is  and includes x*. Thus, 
 the optimal choice is xB = x*, and
The maximized value is
(b)  If , q=1 and the large shareholder will simply restructure the firm and get 
  . 
If 2cM > ∆ holds, the only difference is the possibility of   . In this case, the constraint 
set is , so that the optimum occurs at . Therefore, 
q=0, and no restructuring will occur. The large shareholder gets . The two remaining 
cases of , and  are identical to the previous cases.   
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To sum up, the optimal value for xB=x* as long as q can be made a probability. Otherwise, 
there will be no mixed strategy equilibrium and no trading profit can be made. The expected 
profit for the larger shareholder will be: if the monitoring cost is not so high, so that 2cM≤ ∆ 
holds, we have:
If the monitoring cost is high so that 2cM > ∆ holds, the expected profit is given by
This leads us to Maug’s Proposition 1 and 2:
Proposition 1 & 2: The probability of monitoring q is not decreasing in F ’s initial stake α. It 
unambiguously decreases in the monitoring costs cM. The impact of the market liquidity  on 
the probability of monitoring is not monotonic. 
(Proof ) If 2cM≤ ∆, the probability of monitoring is given by
Since , q is strictly increasing in α up to the point , after 
which α has no impact on q. When , α strictly increases q only when ; 
otherwise, it has no impact on q. If the monitoring cost cM increases, q decreases if 
 and  or  and . Yet, at the same time, an increase in 
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cM raises both  and . Increases in  and  also have negative effect on q. 
If  and  or  and , the direct impact of an 
increase in the market liquidity  on q is to increase q if and only if  . Yet,  is 
increasing in  while  is decreasing in . Therefore, if  , an increase in  reduces 
monitoring probability in the sense that the area where perfect monitoring q=1 occurs. 
When  , an increase in the market liquidity reduces both the non-monitoring 
area and perfect monitoring area. Therefore, the relationship is not monotonic.                  
We restate Maug’s Propisition 3 using our calculations.
Proposition 3 (Social Optimum) The social optimum q=1 is achieved if and only if  
(compare this with Maug’s result).  is increasing in ; F chooses q=1 less frequently if the 
market is more liquid. 
Now, we move to the first round of trading. First, calculate the expected trading profit 
separately when 0<q<1. Then:
The total expected profit is given by
Assume the relevant range. Then, at time 0, the market price will be set according to the 
valuation by the households. Thus, the initial price P0 will be
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Thus, by buying α fraction of shares, F expects to earn
Compare the following two different versions of Proposition 4. If we throw away Maug’s ad 
hoc assumption, a large shareholder does not emerge at all after the first round of trading: 
Proposition 4 (Maug’s calculation: Commitment Effect) At optimum,  , 
and . Thus, the probability of monitoring is strictly increasing in the market 
liquidity .
Proposition 4’(Our calculation) At optimum, α*=0, or the large shareholder does not 
accumulate any share at date 0. If  , he monitors with probability . If 
 , he does not monitor at all. The probability of monitoring is independent of the 
market liquidity . 
(Proof ) First consider the case with  and . In this case,  . 
The expression h(q) attains unconstrained maximum at . Therefore, 
the maximum under the constraint  occurs at  or at α*=0. 
If  , the relevant range is  and 0≤q≤1. In this case, the non-zero root 
of the equation h(q)=0 is negative  . Therefore, the function h(q) is 
strictly decreasing for 0≤q≤1. The maximum is thus achieved by q*=0 or  . Since 
the large shareholder does not monitor and gets no trading profits, he can also choose 
α*=0. Thus, either way, the large shareholder does not buy any share at date 0.
We now come to the ultimate difference between Maug’s and our calculations:
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Proposition 7(Shareholder Value) Initial shareholders’ wealth P0 is either decreasing in the 
market liquidity  or independent of it.
(Proof ) In the first case of , . Since q is 
independent of the market liquidity, and since , we know that P0 is strictly 
decreasing in the market liquidity . In the second case of , P0=L. So market 
liquidity has no impact.
These Propositions clearly show the importance of Maug’s assumption. If we throw away the 
ad-hoc assumption Maug made, no large shareholder emerges in the first round of trading no 
matter how liquid the market is, and the market liquidity does not affect the initial stock price 
at all. 
V. Conclusion
This paper has a very narrow objective of showing that different conclusion results if we 
correctly calculate the equilibrium of the game without making unnecessary ad-hoc assumption. 
This difference seems to be caused by the setup that market liquidity at the second round 
trading is negatively affected by the large shareholder’s initial shareholding α. In other words, 
if he acquires a very large block of shares in the first round, the market liquidity in the second 
round of trading is reduced. Thus he chooses not to buy any shares in the first round of 
trading.   
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